A model for constraint and delegation management by Pham, Quan et al.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
QUT Digital Repository:  
http://eprints.qut.edu.au/ 
Pham, Quan, Reid, Jason F., & Dawson, Edward (2011) A model for constraint and delegation 
management. In: The 7th Information Security Practice and Experience Conference (ISPEC 2011), 
30th May - 1st June 2011, Guangzhou, China. 
 
          © Copyright 2010 please consult authors 
A Model for Constraint and Delegation
Management
Quan Pham, Jason Reid, and Ed Dawson
Information Security Institute, Queensland University of Technology
126 Margaret Street, Brisbane 4000 QLD, Australia
q.pham@isi.qut.edu.au,{jf.reid,e.dawson}@qut.edu.au
Abstract. This paper introduces a model to facilitate delegation, in-
cluding ad-hoc delegation, in cross security domain activities. Specif-
ically, this paper proposes a novel delegation constraint management
model to manage and track delegation constraints across security do-
mains. A procedure to trace the authority of delegation constraints is
introduced as well as a procedure to form a delegation constraint set and
detect/prevent potential conflicts.
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1 Introduction
Delegation is a means for task distribution and the provision of associated priv-
ileges. In a delegation transaction, the process of tracking the propagation of
tasks/privileges and associated constraints within a single security domain is
relatively uncomplicated and therefore, it is possible to achieve a reasonable
level of confidence that the process can be managed and controlled. However,
when dealing with cross security domain transactions (as happens in collabo-
rative activities in grid computing or intensive interactions in cloud computing
environments), this process becomes more difficult to execute securely. The chal-
lenge of tracking constraints and authorisation creates potential uncertainty for
the involved authorities in monitoring and controlling how the delegator and the
delegatee distribute the authorisation.
This paper addresses this concern by proposing a novel delegation con-
straint management model. The model makes it possible to capture the inter-
relationship of delegation transactions and involved constraints - a capability
which is not effectively delivered by the existing approaches (as is identified
later in the paper). The main contributions of this paper are: an administration
model; a procedure to trace the authority of delegation constraints; and a proce-
dure to facilitate delegation, form delegation constraint sets and detect/prevent
potential conflicts.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 analyses issues with
the existing approaches to illustrate the motivation for the investigation. Section
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3 discusses the issue of constraint administration and introduces a procedure
to deduce potentially duplicated/conflicted constraints and prevent them from
being added into an existing delegation constraint set. Section 4 discusses the
issues of delegation management and defines the procedure to determine the
conditions in which delegation, re-delegation and revocation operations can be
conducted. Section 5 concludes the paper by providing an informal evaluation
of the model against the assumptions and problems.
The delegation constraint model described in this paper is presented in full
in a technical report which can be accessed at QUT ePrints (http://eprints.
qut.edu.au/39769). Formal definitions for important concepts such as con-
straint scope, boundary, delegation tree, authority tree and root of authority
are included in the technical report together with illustrative examples of the
operation of the model.
2 Problems and Motivation
Within the context of delegation, if a delegation transaction is conducted by a
delegator to a delegatee from a different domain, there are certain challenges in
administering the transaction. The issue is even more challenging if the delega-
tion is an ad-hoc (user-to-user) delegation or if it is utilised as a base for another
delegation (re-delegation) to a third-party. Specifically, concerning the issue of
delegation and constraint management, an important question arises - how can
the constraints that control the delegation process be communicated and main-
tained? Monitoring the state of the delegation transaction after it moves out of
the original domain is non-trivial. Tracking subsequent delegation transactions
and the involved constraints is a challenge for the original system authority
and the original delegator. The issue is also a challenge for the intermediate
delegators as they may not possess the original authority to fully control the
re-delegation transactions. It is difficult for the system authorities to recognise
and verify the authority of users who initiate the re-delegation transactions.
In the context of cross domain delegation, there are a substantial number
of studies that aim to address these questions [1,3,5,8,7]. Most of these models
can partially address the issue of delegation constraints, especially concerning
structured tasks with sequential execution order. However, there are a number
of situations for which there is no efficient solution. The issue of tracking and en-
forcing constraints in cross domain delegation are among the main issues which
are partially addressed by the eXtensible Access Control Mark-up Language
(XACML) Administration and Delegation profile [7] and the related policy lan-
guages [6]. However, ultimately, open issues remain because none of the existing
approaches effectively allows the inter-relationship of two different delegations
to be defined.
Such issues can not be fully addressed because the current constraint manage-
ment models can not cope with action flows expanding across multiple security
domains. The main reason is that when the delegation activities move from one
domain to another, the part of the information associated with the delegation
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activities, such as delegation constraint set and the source of authority of these
constraints over the delegation activities needs to be communicated and changed
accordingly. It makes constraint monitoring impossible for the current models.
It should be noted that existing approaches including recent developments such
as XACML v3.0 Administration and Delegation profile [7] or X-FEDERATE [4]
also provide certain capabilities to address these issues. However, none of them
can adequately address the challenge of maintaining and tracking delegation in
cross domain activities. The main reason is that most approaches do not have a
model to track and maintain constraints associated with a particular delegation.
Constraints are often expressed separately and it is unclear how the constraints
can be exchanged when the transaction moves across security domains.
In summary, within the area of constraint administration for cross security
domain transactions, the major problem is not fully addressed by the exist-
ing approaches: the absence of a monitoring model that can keep track of and
enforce the involved constraints when moving across multiple security domains.
The problem can be addressed via a mechanism to capture the inter-relationship
of delegation transactions and involved constraints. This paper focuses on ad-
dressing the problem by providing a model for monitoring and tracing delegation
constraints when the delegation is shifting from one security domain to another.
3 Constraint Administration
Constraints are considered as boundaries set by certain controls over a process,
a structure or an entity under certain conditions. A constraint is defined by
its relationship with various organisational entities which are, in turn, placed
within a hierarchical structure. These entities, therefore, are assumed to main-
tain ordered relationships. Due to the ordered nature of typical organisational
hierarchies, a significant proportion of such relationships follow a binary relation
which indicates that one entity of the hierarchy is more senior or precedes an-
other. Because of this phenomenon, principals (e.g., delegators), sub-principals
(e.g., delegatees), constraint targets (e.g., resources) or boundaries can be treated
as elements of partially ordered sets. The constraints are used to determine if a
delegation, a re-delegation or a revocation request is authorised. The main issue
is the management of the delegation process. In addition, the issue of trust vs.
authority, constraint scope vs. effect and conflict prevention are also discussed.
In this section, the conditions for delegation, re-delegation and revocation are
defined.
3.1 Assumptions
Transaction - Constraint Mapping It is a non-trivial issue for the principal
to retrieve constraints issued by the authorities due to the principal’s lack of
knowledge about the context and implications of the delegation transaction. The
assumption is that, given a principal, a sub-principal and a target, the involved
authorities can provide the principal a set of constraints which are potentially
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applicable for the delegation transaction. This function can be addressed by
existing approaches, especially in the workflow area, such as Botha and Eloff
[5], Atluri and Warner [2] and Bertino et al. [3] or by commercial Enterprise
Resource Planning (ERP) products such as SAP R/3, Oracle E-Business Suite
or Microsoft Dynamics. As the model is designed to be a complement for the
existing approaches, the assumption is arguably reasonable.
Common Hierarchy Part of the purpose of the model is to evaluate constraints
against each other based on the seniority of authority (principal), scope of sub-
principal and scope of target. This does not present any great difficulty when
evaluating constraints within a security domain. With cross security domain
transactions, it may be harder to determine the seniority of two elements from
two different security domains. For example, it may be somewhat arbitrary to
assert that a Team Leader from one domain is more senior than a Lead Developer
from another domain.
3.2 Constraint Authority and Trust
As a delegation transaction can involve many delegation steps, (which are collec-
tively represented as a delegation tree) more than one authority may be involved.
Therefore, it is necessary to determine the level of trust of the involved authori-
ties. In addition, as previously discussed, one of the notable contributions of the
model is the recognition of the authority of normal users so that individuals can
place constraints on their own information. The recognition of the authority of
normal users brings with it the need for a mechanism to evaluate and compare
the authority of constraints.
There are two situations in which evaluation of the authority of constraints
is necessary:
– Adding a new constraint to an existing constraint set of a delegation tree:
In this situation, the new constraint is evaluated against other constraints
to determine whether there is an existing constraint with similar effect but
higher authority. This situation happens when the authority wants to achieve
conflict prevention between constraints.
– Performing an evaluation of a specific delegation: This situation usually in-
volves an authorisation request using a re-delegation. In this case, the au-
thority has to determine the root authority of the delegation tree that the
re-delegation is a part of (i.e. the original delegator of the delegation tree).
Generally, there are three types of evaluation: system constraint vs. system
constraint, system constraint vs. user constraint and user constraint vs. user
constraint. It is simple to determine the result of the evaluation of system con-
straints against user constraints as system constraints are more authoritative
and will take precedence. For constraints of the same type, those with higher
authority will take precedence. As a constraint issued by a more senior author-
ity is more trusted than a constraint issued by a less senior authority, in case of
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a conflict, a constraint associated with a senior authority will take precedence.
The constraint with less seniority may be dropped (not added to the constraint
set associated with the delegation tree) and not enforced.
3.3 Constraint Effect and Scope Reduction
As an instrument to prevent conflicted constraints from being added into an
existing constraint set, it is necessary to have a mechanism to detect related
constraints which potentially yield similar or dissimilar effects. There are two
main questions:
– Question 1: Under what conditions should two constraints be considered for
duplication testing?
– Question 2: Under what conditions should a constraint be dropped in favour
of another constraint?
Following the approach of structuring a constraint around four elements: the
principal, the sub-principal, the target and the boundary, Question 1 should
be addressed by considering the sub-principal and the target. It implies the two
constraints should be evaluated if they have similar scopes. The first two elements
are the two factors which define the area of impact (the scope) of a constraint.
Therefore, given two constraints, they should be tested if one constraint has both
broader target and sub-principal scope than the other.
To find an answer for Question 2 is more complex. Assuming that two con-
straints have the same authority, for the sake of security, the one which is more
restrictive and broader in scope, should take precedence. However, this setting
can be changed as it is up to the authority to determine the appropriate setting
for its environment. A constraint should only be dropped if it directly contradicts
another constraint with higher priority and the same scope. Therefore, given
two constraints, the second constraint will be dropped if the first constraint has
higher authority and broader scope and boundary than the other.
However, there is not always a simple answer for Question 2. For example,
if c1 has broader sub-principal scope but less target scope; and c2 has higher
authority, then there is no obvious answer for the reduction process. In this
case, both constraints should be evaluated. The result is determined based on
the combining rule as discussed below.
ConstraintPrincipal Sub-principal Target Boundary
c1 Alice Bob Project ABC Access only at day
c2 Alice’s partners Bob’s depart-
ment
Task 1 of Project
ABC
Access for 1 week
only
Table 1. An Example Constraints with Potential Conflicts.
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Table 1 presents two constraints which are potentially conflicted. In this ex-
ample, if Bob requires access to a file which is part of Task 1, what decision
should be made? In this paper, to address this issue, a conflict resolution tech-
nique of XACML can be adopted in which the principal with root authority of
the delegation tree (which the constraints are associated with) can specify the
way in which the conflict should be resolved. Specifically, a similar approach to
XACML’s combining algorithms, namely deny-override, permit-override, first-
applicable and only-one-applicable, can be utilised. For example, in Table 1, if
the permit-override rule is applied, it is considered as satisfied if either of the
constraints are met. In contrast, if the deny-override rule is applied, the com-
bined effect is only for Bob and only for Task 1 of Project ABC for 1 week during
the day. It it important to note that, similar to XACML, in a number of cases, it
is not possible to achieve a combined effect. In such cases, a conflict is reported.
4 Delegation Administration
In this section, two operations of a delegation transaction are discussed: delega-
tion and revocation. A delegation d is represented as a function of f in which
f can be delegate or revoke. As the proxy of the delegation operations, each
function is associated with a poset of constraints. These functions form the basis
for the whole delegation process.
In order to govern the operations with constraints, a checking mechanism is
necessary. To provide the checking function, the model in this paper provides a
set of predicates for each type of function. The predicate is a Boolean function
to check a specific function against a specific boundary or a set of boundaries to
form a constraint.
– canDelegate: This predicate is the general predicate to govern a delegation
operation which employs the function against the constraint boundary. This
predicate is not concerned with the specific function (issuing policy, granting
or transferring token). If the predicate is satisfied, the delegation transaction
can proceed via any one of three aforementioned functions.
– canReceive: This is a predicate that determines if a user can receive the
delegation. It is necessary in the case of non-optimistic delegation. As if this
is the case, the delegator and/or the involved authority want to know about
the eligibility of the delegatee regarding the involved delegation.
– canRevoke: This predicate is designed to determine if a delegation can be
revoked. The inclusion of the function is for administration purposes so that
the information from the function revoke can be used to assess against the
constraint boundary.
4.1 Delegation and Re-delegation
The delegation creation is conducted based on the evaluation of two predicates:
canDelegate and canReceive. canReceive can be considered as an extra step
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because in optimistic delegation, the delegator (the principal) does not wish to
confirm in advance that the delegatee can discharge the delegation and therefore,
the canReceive predicate may not be necessary.
To successfully initiate a delegation transaction, the following procedure is
conducted.
– If the delegation is not conducted based on the delegator’s power but based
on a previous delegation, then this is a re-delegation. The procedure needs
to retrieve the previous delegation tree and its associated constraint set.
– If this is not re-delegation, then the delegator creates its own constraint
and/or retrieves applicable constraints from the system authority.
– Verify the canDelegate predicate. If verification of eligibility to receive the
delegation is required, then verify the canReceive predicate.
– If this is a re-delegation constraint, retrieve the delegation tree which is
applicable for the involved delegation.
– Modify the delegation tree by adding another node into the tree to complete
the delegation. The information about the delegation tree and its associated
constraint set is controlled by the principal with the root authority (the
original delegator in case of re-delegation).
The revocation constraint chain must be formed as the delegation constraint
chain is formed (via the delegation tree). For every delegation, a revocation
constraint must be formed. The approach is similar to forming the delegation
constraint chain. Therefore, the structure of the revocation constraint chain must
be identical to the delegation constraint chain. In delegation or re-delegation, it
is important to discuss the issue of the delegation tree. The delegation tree is
used to manage the re-delegation from an original delegation. All subsequent re-
delegations must be conducted with the authority less senior than the original
delegation.
Forming the delegation tree plays an important role. The primary objective
of this procedure is to retrieve all delegation trees known to the system authority
at that point in time and return the tree that contains the input delegation. The
root authority of the delegation in question can be retrieved from the output
delegation tree. The procedure is called every time a delegation request is con-
ducted. The main point is to allow the involved users and authority to know
where the delegation comes from. In other words, the procedure is utilised to
pin-point the source of the delegation. From the graph theory perspective, the
reduction process is actually a graph search. The search compares the input del-
egation with each node of every delegation tree until a tree with a matched node
is found.
The procedure of verifying for canReceive is similar to the one for canDelegate.
After successful delegation, if this is a re-delegation, the delegator must notify
the principal with root authority to update the delegation tree. It is important
to note that, usually after a delegation, the delegator or the original delegator
should specify constraints for execution and revocation. If not, then there is no
control over these two operations.
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4.2 Revocation
The revocation is based on the canRevoke predicate. The process for revocation
includes the following steps:
– Retrieve all delegation trees associated with the targeted delegation;
– Identify the tree containing the target delegation;
– Verify any constraints that are imposed on the revocation process to check
the canRevoke predicate (the procedure is similar to the one applied for
canDelegate discussed above);
– Remove appropriate delegation nodes. When the revocation is completed for
the root authority, the whole delegation tree is revoked.
In our approach, revocation can be achieved in a simple way compared to
others such as Tamasia et al. [9] or Wang and Osborn [10]. This is because
all the control of the delegation tree rests with the root authority. As discussed
above, if the authority can not trace a delegation back to an authorised principal,
the request is not honoured. So, to revoke or in other words to dishonour a
request using a delegation, it is only necessary to disconnect the delegation from
the root authority to make the trace of authority impossible. This feature is
a significant contribution because it is not necessary to remove the subsequent
branch. This improves the effectiveness of the whole model. This is possible
due to the enforcement model in which all re-delegations must be traced back
to the root authority. The convenience in revocation is paid via the cost of
managing the delegation tree information of the root authority. In our approach,
the root authority must be notified to update the tree but there is no need for
the subsequent delegatees to know, because after the revocation, all subsequent
delegations are rendered ineffective. Notifying the subsequent entities in the
delegation tree is optional and can be done to increase the situation awareness.
The advantage of this revocation arrangement is that there is no need for a
cascading approach which is very computationally expensive. Every time there
is an revocation request, there are only two things to do: firstly, check the au-
thority and the delegation constraint; secondly, if they match, remove the whole
delegation constraint chain. By doing so, the corresponding delegation is effec-
tively revoked. In addition, it should be noted that revocation due to violation of
a specified constraint is also not necessary because the delegation is simply not
honoured. Also, as some approaches have a depth for revocation, it is not really
practical for a limited or partial revocation and not utilised by the model. The
main reason is that all re-delegation is based on the additional power received
from a previous delegation. If the previous delegation (the base) is revoked, there
is no base for the current delegation to exist. Therefore, it must be also revoked.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
As discussed in Section 2, the difficulty in performing cross-domain delegation
was linked to an open problem. To address the problem, it is vital to maintain
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constraint information when the transaction moves across security domains. This
function is principally achieved by four components: the delegation tree and the
authority tree. These two components provide the means to carry delegation
and constraint information. Information about a particular delegation transac-
tion and the associated constraints can be cross-referenced from the delegation
tree. Even if the delegation moves across security domains, the model is still
able to cope as all involved entities in the delegation transaction have a common
knowledge of the delegation tree. The delegation tree is the primary means to
trace the authority of the involved delegation transactions and constraints. To-
gether with the constraint evaluation algorithms (the scope and effect reduction
algorithms which can be found in full in the technical report), the delegation
tree is also the means to provide necessary information to evaluate a delegation
transaction and therefore, contribute to the enforcement process. The model also
addresses the problem by allowing a constraint to be associated with, not just
the resource but the action that affects the resource.
Via these design features, the proposed delegation constraint management
model can establish a link between constraints and between constraints and the
involved entities and a chain of authority with respect to a particular constraint.
These are the principal factors to capture the inter-relationships between delega-
tion transactions and the involved constraints. Another important aspect of the
approach which needs to be pointed out is that it has only a limited capacity
to perform conflict resolution between policies but focuses instead on conflict
prevention. From the conflict resolution perspective, the model can modify or
discard certain policies/constraints (for example, the ones with less senior au-
thority) to remove the associated conflicts. This approach is sound from the the-
oretical and security perspective though it only addresses one potential source
of conflicts. In real world, it is anticipated that there will be numerous other
conflicts that the model cannot resolve. This is admittedly a limitation of the
proposed approach. The impact of this can be lessened to some degree via an
implementation that rejects if there is conflict but at the same time, advises the
involved entities in the delegation process of details of the source of the conflict
and suggests ways to avoid the conflict by reducing the scope and/or the power
of the delegation or by recommending they approach an authority for further
constraint relaxation.
The assumption of utilisation of a common hierarchy in constructing the
constraint management approach also presents challenges for a real-world im-
plementation (Section 3.1). In the model, the algorithms to determine the root
authority and to reduce constraint effect and scope, need a common hierarchy to
function properly. However, the method to produce this hierarchy is not part of
the model. The hierarchies are assumed to be the result of negotiation and agree-
ment between the collaborating domains and the process may produce somewhat
arbitrary results. This is a long-standing issue within the context of managing
security for cross domain activities that lies outside the scope of this paper.
In summary, this paper described a model to manage the delegation process
and its associated constraints. The model can be considered as the solution for
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the issue of how to effectively manage and enforce constraints, particularly when
the constraints are distributed or come from different security domains. The
model provides an efficient way to evaluate delegation to support authorisation
decision making and revocation via allowing the principal with root authority to
retain full control over the information concerning the delegation tree and the
associated constraints. The model is able to manage and prevent potential con-
flicts from happening when adding more constraints into an existing constraint
set. As a notable contribution, the model recognises the authority of a normal
user in terms of constraint issuing and management. The approach is also novel
in terms of recognising the relationship between the delegation transactions and
between the constraints and their elements.
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